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Darwin and Ontology1 
Elizabeth Grosz 
I speak to you today neither as somebody working in or on literature nor as some- 
body working in the sciences; instead I come from that neglected place in between, 
that is neither literary nor scientific, though at its best it aspires to both while 
accomplishing neither, the place of philosophy, or rather, of a kind of philosophy 
that is ostracized by the discipline of philosophy and has thus taken shelter in the 
hospitable institutional locations that literature, and to a lesser extent, science, 
sometimes offer. I want to speak about something that I believe is relevant to both 
literature and science while it nonetheless remains the provenance of philosophy: 
about questions of ontology and their powerful but neglected contributions to 
how we think life and matter, the preoccupations, in the most abstract sense, of lit- 
erature and science respectively. 
Ontology seems to be the forgotten or repressed element of contemporary philo- 
sophical thought and in what literature and science borrow from philosophy. The 
devastating critique of metaphysics that both revitalized the natural sciences, helped 
generate the social sciences, and effectively transformed both philosophy and litera- 
ture during the early years of the twentieth century has perhaps succeeded only too 
well not only in adjudicating the appropriate and inappropriate questions to which 
knowledge must direct itself, but in dismissing many questions that, it seems, we 
cannot do without, that we cannot but ask. Some of the most basic questions of 
ontology-what is matter? what is life? how do they link together? what are their 
relations of intrication2-need to be readdressed, perhaps not in the same terms in 
which they were originally considered, but in more contemporary terms, which 
account for the social, historical and political context in which metaphysics is 
invariably if unconsciously embedded. In the desire to abandon metaphysical pre- 
suppositions and to replace the apparently unanswerable questions of ontology 
with the more modest propositions of epistemology, to move from the unknown to 
the knowable, shifting the ground from what exists to what we can know, the 
inevitable ontological investments of discourses, the presuppositions they must 
make about the modes, types and forms of existence they analyze, have remained 
unexamined, though the production of ontologies continues unabated. 
For the purposes of this paper, I will concentrate on only an element in the work 
of Charles Darwin, the first of the great theorists of temporal becoming. Darwin 
developed the theory of natural selection not only into a scientific research para- 
digm of unparalleled fruitfulness and success for nearly a century and a half, but 
also generated a philosophical discourse, which elaborates conceptions of matter, 
life and time, whose ontological resonances have still not been properly under- 
stood, even today. 
While there has been a great deal of attention devoted to Darwinism, to scien- 
tific developments and elaborations within biology and its cognate disciplines 
since the writings of Darwin himself, and while Darwinism has had a powerful 
effect on literature, on cultural and artistic representations, on economic and polit- 
ical discourses particularly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
rather surprisingly, it has not had the same impact in philosophy, which has tended 
to address it only marginally, if at all. Only in recent years has analytic philosophy 
embraced Darwinian biological models as paradigms of mind;2 and it is even rarer 
to find philosophers from the Continental tradition invested in exploring the 
philosophical implications of Darwin's work. 
It will be my claim that, although there are acknowledged and well-recognized 
gaps and points of unclarity in Darwin's understanding-most notably, his self- 
avowed ignorance of the mechanisms of inheritance, published in earliest form by 
Gregor Mendel in 1863, only a few years after the publication of the first edition 
of Darwin's T h e  Origin of Species (1859)-his account of the development of 
species, including the descent of man, provides a powerful and fundamentally 
plausible and suitably complex understanding both of the genesis of (primitive) life 
from the complexity of matter, and of the growing elaboration, adaptation and 
specialization of organisms to their life conditions. Whether knowingly or not, 
Darwin develops an ontology, an account of a real, that is fundamentally different 
from that of his predecessors and contemporaries. It is an open and generative 
force of self-organization and growing complexity, a real that grows, that is 
dynamic, that has features of its own which, rather than simply exhibit ongoing 
stability, are as readily understood in terms of the active forces of change. Darwin 
managed to make this dynamism, this imperative to change, the center of his 
understanding of life itself. He makes it clear, and indeed a founding presupposi- 
tion, that time, along with life itself, always moves forward, becomes more rather 
than less complex, producing divergences rather than convergences over time. He 
make temporality an irreducible element of both matter (matter as geological 
record) and of life (descent). 
The question of origins, and originality, is paradoxically not only the buried 
center of Darwin's concept of the evolution of species, it is also one of the critical 
historical questions directed to Darwin's own discourse. It is a truism that Dar- 
win's The  Origin of Species precisely refuses to deal with the question of the origin 
of species! It is also well recognized that Charles Darwin is not really the 'origina- 
tor' of the theory of natural selection, of modification with descent, or the struggle 
for existence, though his name is now singularly associated with bringing a mass 
of scientific information together to produce an ever more credible and carefully 
detailed account through presenting a vast repertoire of empirical observations to 
confirm his carefully articulated claims. 
The question of the origin of species is intimately bound up with the question of 
the identity, or unity, of the object of biological and historical investigation. This is 
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among the most complex and under-discussed elements of Darwinism. What is the 
minimal unit, the scientific object, of investigation? The individual, the group, the 
species, or genera? The ways in which species develop and undergo modification 
over the passage of time is closely linked with what the criteria of differentiation 
between one group and another closely allied with it are. What differentiates one 
species from another? How do we tell where one species ends and another begins? 
How small or large must the differences be for us to designate the emergence of 
new species from already existing ones? In attempting to devise workable, though 
not essentialist, answers to these questions, Darwin inadvertently introduces a fun- 
damental, irreducible indeterminacy into the largely Newtonian framework he 
aspired to transpose into the field of natural history: the impossibility of either 
exact prediction or even precise calculation, the seeking of tendencies rather than 
individual causes, of principles rather than universal laws. Darwin introduced a 
new understanding of what science must be to be adequate to the real of life itself, 
to the real of time and change-something Newtonian physics not only ignored 
but was unable to explain-and it was this that differentiated his understanding of 
natural selection from those of his contemporaries and predecessors: such a sci- 
ence could not take the ready-made or pregiven unity of individuals or classes for 
granted but had to  understand how any provisional unity and cohesion derives 
from the oscillations and vacillations of difference. His understanding of science is 
necessarily committed to a concept of history, and thus of events, which are always 
unique and unrepeatable, which defy precise causal explanation, and which can 
only provide explanation at a certain level of generality-not Laplace's demon, 
which can calculate all the causal links constituting any event, but broad tenden- 
cies, which explain no individual in particular, but which calculate species in terms 
of gradual individual transformation. 
Instead of a theory of genetic origin, or a theory of descent from original pri- 
mordial ancestors, paradoxically and without much analysis by other commenta- 
tors, Darwin seems to produce a quite peculiar, and thoroughly postmodern, 
account of 'origin': Origin is neither a divinely ordained beginning ex nihilo, a 
magical creation or gift, nor is it the result of an infinite, unbroken material and 
historical chain of organisms linked through descent, the two residual theological 
models, creationism and infinite or eternal existence. Origin is a consequence of 
human or rather, scientific, taxonomy, a function of language. Origin is a nominal 
issue. What constitutes an origin depends on what we call a species, where we 
(arbitrarily or with particular purposes in mind) decide to draw the line between 
one group and another that resembles it, pre-exists it, or abides in close proximity 
with it. What we call a species depends on certain affinities and resemblances, as 
well as on differences and incompatibilities. A species is an arbitrarily chosen set 
of similarities that render other differences either marginal or insignificant. Species 
are a measure, an incalculable, non-numerical measure, of significant difference. 
The individuals constituting each species vary immensely from each other; and 
when these variations exhibit some systematicity and resemblance, we may be jus- 
tified in describing the individuals thus associated as a variety; and similarly, it is 
only if the variety has marked and significant differences from other varieties that 
it has the potential to develop into separate species, genera and phyla. The origin 
of species can be understood as the measure of degrees of difference between indi- 
viduals and groups, a kind of biological pure difference. "Evolution" itself, from 
the Latin e-volvere, means "to roll out," to "unfold," and while it is a term Darwin 
himself avoids, preferring the phrase "natural selection," it is actually perfect to  
capture this difference which is never based on a given unity but on a broad com- 
munity-in-difference and common history which could be understood as biologi- 
cal 'memory,' as the present traces and supercessions of the past. 
There is no given mode of definition or genealogical method that could, with- 
out arbitrariness, provide clear-cut units to undertake the retrospective and recon- 
structive search for origins that any historical method implies. One could impose 
definitions a priori on species and varieties, as did the neoclassical Aristotelians 
like Buffon and Cuvier, but then one would have to explain the generation of vast 
anomalies, and in doing so, one would lose sight of what justifiably enables indi- 
viduals to be grouped into categories or types: "No criterion can possibly be given 
by which variable forms, local forms, subspecies, and representative species can be 
recognisedy3 which he later elaborates as follows: 
Certainly no clear line of demarcation has as yet been drawn between species and 
sub-species, that is, the forms which in the opinion of some naturalists come very 
near to, but do not quite arrive at, the rank of species; or, again, between sub- 
species and well-marked varieties, or between lesser varieties and individual differ- 
ences. These differences blend into each other by an insensible series; and a series 
impresses the mind with the idea of an actual pa~sage.~ 
In other words, the differences between individuals do not thereby generate dif- 
ferences in kind or category. Individual differences form continua, whose divisions 
remain relatively arbitrary, contingent on the pragmatic purposes of the division. 
Differences which "blend into each other by an insensible series" are differences of 
degree rather than of kind. Yet it is the continual production of degrees of differ- 
ence that, over long enough periods of time, will generate kinds of difference. The 
differences between individuals, if they are significant, if they make a difference that 
is pronounced enough, produce varieties, which, if their differences are significant, 
generate the capacity to be categorized together as species. Darwin makes it clear 
that it is not simply differences, or even difference mingled with modes of repeti- 
tion/ reproduction, that constitute the basic categories of life and of species, but 
rather, modalities, types or degrees of difference: it is "the passage from one stage 
of difference to anotherY'5 which is central to the operations of natural selection, the 
movement of differentiation which, as gradual and possibly imperceptible as it is, 
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marks off varying degrees of differentiation from one generation to the next. Varia- 
tions are crucial for the breadth, density and longevity of species, but these varia- 
tions are the very mechanism by which differences in kind are born. However, what 
constitutes a variation, and what remains simply an individual modification within 
a species is not just qualitative, for the quantitative plays a significant role in the 
movement from variety to species: a variety is considered a variety only insofar as 
its numbers have not yet surpassed those in the species of which it is a variation: 
If a variety were to flourish so as to exceed in numbers the parent species, it would 
then rank as the species, and the species as the variety; or it might come to supplant 
and exterminate the parent species; or both might CO-exist, and both rank as inde- 
pendent species.. . 
From these remarks, it will be seen that I look at the term species as one arbitrarily 
given, for the sake of convenience, to a set of individuals closely resembling each 
other, and that it does not essentially differ from the term variety, which is given to 
less distinct and more fluctuating forms. The term variety, again, in comparison with 
mere individual differences, is also applied arbitrarily, for convenience' sake.6 
In other words, his objects of analysis are distinctive or significant differences, 
differences whose divergence can only be understood differentially, that is, retro- 
spectively and comparatively -historically -rather than in terms of any fixed or 
unchanging characteristics, any content, essence, function or morphological fea- 
ture. There is no origin of species because there is no unity from which descent is 
derived, only types, variations of differences and types of reproduction and descent, 
which must be assumed from the start. This structure of variation or differentia- 
tion, as modern biochemists hypothesize, may in fact characterize the status of 
those prebiotic elements whose status "on the edge of chaos"7 prepares for their 
transformation into primitive proteins, that is, for the emergence of primitive life. 
The ongoing production of individual differences is the internal motor, the "vital- 
ist impetus" as Bergson quite profoundly understood, a tendency we may see as 
the orientation to self-organization, which directs or orients individuals, in ways 
unrecognized by Darwin and still relatively obscure today, to varying from their 
parents and from each other, not through the blending of parental characteristics, 
as Darwin had supposed, but through the complex processes of meiotic division 
and recombination that characterize embryological development. These perceptual 
or motor individual differences are the raw materials of natural selection. These 
slight and usually minor individual variations have unknown causes. However, 
Darwin's ignorance of the principles of heritability did not compromise his under- 
standing of evolutionary processes, and this is in part because he did not seek out 
the causes of individual variation but only their effects (it is also significant that 
although some contemporary gene-centred research is attempting causal explana- 
tions of individual variation, the astronomical number of genetic elements, the 
complexity of their rules of combination, and the impossibility of any one-to-one 
mapping of genes to phenotypical characteristics makes this a nearly impossible 
project. It is for this reason, among others, that genetic research is at best statisti- 
cal or probabilistic rather than deterministic. It analyzes tendencies and orienta- 
tions rather than causal linkages, which means that it generalizes about 
populations rather than individuals). It is this that enabled evolutionary theory to 
remain agnostic relative to, and to remain independent of, the particular theories 
of genetics to be later developed: 
We are profoundly ignorant of the cause of each variation. We are far too ignorant 
to speculate on the relative importance of the several known factors; and I have 
made these remarks only to show that ... we ought not to lay too much stress on our 
ignorance of the precise causes of the slight analogous differences between species ... 
The laws governing inheritance are for the most part unknown. No one can say why 
the same peculiarity in different individuals of the same species, or in different 
species, is sometimes inherited and sometimes not so ...a 
Genetics is unable to explain a direct causal connection between a genetic ele- 
ment-a single gene, a single chromosome-and a singular phenotypic characteris- 
tic, "the cause of each variation." Darwin's acceptance of both the impossibility 
and the dispensability of any causal explanation was central to his reformulation 
of biology: from now on, what causes a change is of less interest than the 
antecedents, the ancestors, of that change. Randomness is introduced into the 
dimension of heritability. Even if it is clear that all inherited material comes from 
one's parents, it remains unpredictable which genetic characters will be selected 
and combined, which will function as dominant or recessive relative to each other, 
in short, what particular detailed kinds of individual will be formed, until the indi- 
vidual is there. Then retroactive analysis can begin. This remains as true today as 
in Darwin's time. There is a fundamental randomness about the particular, 
detailed chromosomal structure of the individual, but even more significantly, 
there is a fundamental randomness of individual variation relative to natural selec- 
tion. They function independently of each other, variations being generated inde- 
pendent of adaptedness, generated, so it seems, for their own reasons. 
Darwin wants to link the most significant differences that constitute species, 
sub-species and varieties, and the associated problem of the "origin" of species, to 
the differences between individuals. Indeed his individualism is fundamentally 
linked to  his anti-essentialism.9 Species cannot be readily defined for they are not 
constituted of essential features, abilities or forms: species are nothing but the 
aggregation of interbreeding individuals who share a common descent. Many biol- 
ogists before Darwin recognized that species varied, but such variation was 
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regarded only in limited terms: species, like celestial bodies, underwent cycles of 
growth and reproduction, and this type of systematic and predictable variation, as 
well as those systematic differences that constitute the sexual bifurcation of many 
species, could well be accommodated in a typology rather than a genealogy of 
species; but when Darwin construed species as a post hoc aggregation of individu- 
als, what required explanation was no longer the possibility of individual variation 
but the converse, the long-term, relative stability of the characteristics attributable 
to species. The question is converted from: how can individuals vary so widely? to: 
how can species maintain their identity and cohesion over time? In effect, he 
dynamized and historicized species through linking them to the continuous varia- 
tion produced through individuals, developing an anti-essentialism of species only 
by propounding an essentialism of individuals (an essentialism that itself is being 
displaced, perhaps even deconstructed, through the understanding of individuals 
as the products of the differentiations of genetic and environmental factors that 
are each themselves differential rather than essential in their functioning). 
Most individual differences under most sets of circumstances remain largely irrel- 
evant to natural selection: it is only under crisis conditions, when selective pressures 
are at their strongest, that they acquire the status of instruments of privilege and 
survival. Natural selection functions to select negatively for those characteristics 
which may prove harmful to the individual and its progeny, and to provide a con- 
text in which benign or benevolent characteristics are positively preferred over 
those individuals in which they are absent or less developed. These individual dif- 
ferences become relevant to the categories and forms of selection only when species 
are approaching a Malthusian state of maximum growth, when even slight or mar- 
ginal advantages offer the individual some hope of survival over others. 
Darwin's model of evolution, of the biological unfolding of life, involves the 
complex interplay between the principles of individual variation, heritability, and 
natural selection provide, on the one hand, an explanation of a series of processes 
and interactions that are fundamentally mindless and automatic (as Dennett has 
recognized), but, on the other, are also entirely unpredictable and inexplicable in 
causal terms or in any terms which atomize or isolate units, steps, or stages. Dar- 
win conceptualize a machinery of natural forces-no longer gravity or mechanics, 
no longer precisely predictable-that, when they operate as a complex, as an 
assemblage, produce both massive variation, and the beauty and elegance of life 
adapted in its most intimate contours and features to its environment. Natural 
selection does not simply limit life, cull it, remove its unsuccessful variations: it 
provokes life, incites the living to transform themselves, to become something 
other than what they once were, to differentiate themselves by what they will 
become. Natural selection is not simply a passive background or context within 
which individual variation unfolds, a mere landscape that highlights and positions 
the living being; it is a dynamic force which sets goals, provides resources, and 
incentives for the ever-inventive functioning of species. Natural selection entails 
that the material world, and the other organisms by which a living being is sur- 
rounded, function as positive provocation to the self-overcoming that is the most 
basic characteristic of life, this self-overcoming attesting to the irreducible invest- 
ment of life in the movement of time, its enmeshment and organization according 
to the forward direction of time. 
To sum up then, some of the key implications of Darwin's model of inheritance, 
variation and descent, by way of a conclusion: 
1. Darwin's work, if it is relevant as all, is not only a theory of biological but 
also of cultural, social and political development. What Darwin's work makes 
clear is that what has occurred to an individual in the operations of a milieu or 
environment (it matters little here if it is natural or cultural) is the force or impetus 
that propels that individual to processes of self-transformation. The struggle for 
existence is precisely that which induces the production of ever more viable and 
successful strategies, strategies whose success can only be measured by the degree 
to  which they induce transformation in the criteria by which natural selection 
functions. Evolution and growth, in nature as in culture, are precisely about over- 
coming what has happened to the individual through the history, memory, and 
innovation open to  that individual, and group. This is true of the survival of 
species as much as it is of the survival of political strategies and positions, histori- 
cal events and memories, linguistic structures or economic processes. Darwin 
makes it clear that self-overcoming is incessantly, if slowly, at work in the life of 
species. The logic by which this self-overcoming occurs is the same for natural as 
for social force. This self-overcoming, however, cannot survive as a wild trajectory 
unconnected to the past. Any viable evolutionary strategy always implies a conti- 
nuity with the past, even if not its conservation: evolutionary movement functions 
through a continuous differentiation, that is to say, with what coheres with the 
past through gradations; 
2. Darwin accounts for the social, not directly, not through biology, for the bio- 
logical structure of man in no way pre-empts the forms of social organization 
within which he will live, but through the logic of natural selection. Culture can- 
not be viewed as the completion of nature, its culmination or end, but must be 
seen as the ramifying product and effect of a nature that is ever-prodigious in its 
techniques of production and selection, and whose scope is capable of infinite and 
unexpected expansion in directions that cannot be predicted in advance. Lan- 
guage, culture, intelligence, reason, imagination, memory-terms commonly 
claimed as defining characteristics of the human and the cultural-are all equally 
effects of the same rigorous criteria of natural selection: unless they provide some 
kind of advantage to survival, some kind of strategic value to those with access to 
them, there is no reason why they should be uniquely human attributes, or 
unquestionably valuable attributes. Darwin affirms a fundamental continuity 
between the natural and the social, and the complicity, not just of the natural with 
the requirements of the social, but also of the social with the selective procedures 
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governing the order and organization of the natural. According to Darwinian pre- 
cepts, culture is not different in kind from nature but an indeterminable elabora- 
tion of the virtualities of the natural; 
3. Darwin had provided a model of time and development that refuses any pre- 
given aim, goal or destination for natural selection. This already serves to differen- 
tiate Darwin from virtually all of his followers. He refuses anything like the telos 
or directionality of the dialectic, or a commitment to progressivism in which we 
must always regard what presently exists as superior to or more developed than its 
predecessors. Evolution is both fundamentally open but also regulated within 
quite strict parameters. We cannot assume that the goal of natural selection is the 
survival of the individual or the species, nor can we assume that the goal of evolu- 
tion is the proliferation of progeny (as is common in contemporary sociobiology). 
Darwin makes it clear that many species support and indeed require non-repro- 
ductive members; it is thus not clear that any pregiven aim or goal can function as 
the purpose or function of evolution. There are historical constraints on what 
becomes a possible path of biologicall cultural effectivity: it is only that which has 
happened, those beings in existence, now or once, that provide the germs or virtu- 
alities whose divergence produces the present and future. That which has hap- 
pened, the paths of existence actualized, pre-empt the virtualities that other 
existences may have brought with them, they set different paths and trajectories 
than those that might have been; 
4. This logic of self-overcoming, the motor of Darwinian evolution, must be rec- 
ognized not only as a distribution of (geographical and geology) spacing, but 
above all as a form of temporization, in which the pull of the future exerts a pri- 
mary force. Beings are impelled forward to a future that is unknowable, and rela- 
tively uncontained by the past. It is only retrospection that can determine what 
direction the paths of development, of evolution or transformation, have taken 
and it is only an indefinitely deferred future that can indicate whether the past or 
the present provide a negative or positive legacy for those to come. This means 
that history and its cognate practices (geology, archaeology, anthropology, psycho- 
analysis, medical diagnostics etc. etc.) are required for understanding the current, 
always partial and residual situation as an emergence from a train of temporal 
events already given, which set the terms for but in no way control or direct a 
future fanning out or proliferation which follows directions latent or virtual but 
not necessarily actualized in the present. History, the partial and ambiguous record 
of the past, is not adequate to indicate particular trends, directions and variations 
that may occur in the future. 
5. One of the more significant questions facing contemporary political dis- 
courses is precisely what generates change, how change is facilitated, what ingredi- 
ents, processes and forces are at work in generating the conditions for change, and 
how change functions in relation to the past and the present. Darwin presents 
here, in quite developed if not entirely explicit form, the germs for an account of 
the place of futurity, the direction forward as the opening up, diversification or 
bifurcation of the latencies of the present, which provide a kind of ballast for the 
induction of a future different but not detached from the past and present, a future 
that functions through the propulsion of the past but without the direct mediation 
or control of the present. The future emerges from the interplay of a repetition of 
cultural1 biological factors, and the emergence of new conditions of survival: it 
must be connected, genealogically related to what currently exists, but is capable 
of any possible variation or development of current existence. The new is the gen- 
eration of a productive or viable monstrosity; 
6 .  Darwin's work, with the centrality it attributes to random variation, to  
chance transformations and thus to the unpredictable, has provided and will con- 
tinue to provide something of a bridge between the emphasis on determinism that 
is so powerful in classical science and the place of indetermination that has been 
so central to the contemporary form of the humanities. Evolution is neither free 
and unconstrained, nor determined and predictable in advance. It is neither com- 
mensurate with the temporality of physics and the mathematical sciences, nor is it 
unlimited in potential and completely free in direction. Rather, it implies a notion 
of overdetermination, indetermination and a systemic openness that precludes pre- 
cise determination; and 
7. Darwin had provided a model of history that resorts neither to the telos or a 
priorism of the dialectic, nor to a simple empiricism which sees history only as the 
accumulation of variously connected or unconnected events. History, both social 
and evolutionary, small-term and long-term history, is both fundamentally open 
but also regulated within quite strict parameters. There are historical constraints 
on what becomes a possible path of biological1 cultural effectivity: it is only that 
which has happened, those beings in existence, now or once, that provide the 
germs whose divergence produces the present and future. That which has hap- 
pened, the paths of existence actualized, pre-empt the virtualities that other exis- 
tences may have brought with them, setting different paths and trajectories than 
those that might have been. History is a broader phase space than that which can 
be occupied by living beings. And the history or genealogy of living beings trans- 
forms and magnifies this phase space, the space of virtualities or latencies, as they 
transform themselves. While history remains open-ended, the past provides a 
propulsion in directions, unpredictable in advance, which, in retrospect have 
emerged from the unactualized possibilities that it yields. 
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